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I. INTRODUCTION
On the twelfth day of January, 1888, in Adams County, Nebraska,
Loren Fairbank's cow was driven by wind onto a barbed wire fence,
where it soon expired. Fairbank presented a claim to the German In-
surance Company under a property insurance policy in which the in-
surer promised to indemnify Fairbank up to various policy limits for
loss to (among other things) cattle, caused by (among other perils)
windstorms. There was no dispute about the cause of Fairbank's loss
* Margaret R. Larson Professor of Insurance Law, University of Nebraska College
of Law.
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or the amount of his claim. Nonetheless, the insurer refused to pay on
the grounds that Fairbank had failed to satisfy several express condi-
tions spelled out in the policy. The district court entered judgment for
Fairbank. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed.1 Two
of the alleged failures of condition were not enough to bar recovery;
however, Fairbank's failure to prove that he had satisfied the third, a
postloss condition requiring timely proofs of loss, was fatal to his
claim.
Of course, there is more to the story than appears on the face of the
Nebraska Reports. The wind that strained both Fairbank's cow and
Fairbank's relations with his insurer was no ordinary wind, but part of
the "School Children's Blizzard" of 1888,2 a storm credited with work-
ing permanent changes in the nature of the cattle industry throughout
the plains, immigration and emigration patterns, and even the design
and siting of school buildings. And District Judge William Gaslin was
no ordinary judge; in a sixteen-year judicial career in a district that
encompassed more than half of Nebraska, this "great judge.., noted
for short-cut justice"3 presided over sixty-eight murder trials with a
flair that made him something of a folk hero and frequently put him
at odds with the supreme court and many of the lawyers and litigants
who appeared before him.4 And 1891 was no ordinary year for the
Nebraska Supreme Court; while the Fairbank case was pending, the
court was dragged into the vortex of the Populist "Political and Social
Revolution of 1890," forced to become involved in the decision of who
would be governor while under threat of arrest by roaming militia if
its decision went the wrong way!5 And ....
1. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 49 N.W. 711 (1891).
2. For a summary discussion of the "peculiar historical and social significance" of
the storm, see Clement, The Blizzard of 1888, in ROUNDUP: A NEBRASKA READER
263, 265 (V. Faulkner ed. 1957). For an extended treatment, see W. O'GARA, IN
ALL ITS FURY (1935). For a different-but equally evocative-effort, see Reynal,
The Blizzard of '88 (mural in the foyer of the Nebraska State Capitol).
3. Judge Gaslin Stories, 4 NEB. HIsT. 44, 45 (1921).
4. Judge Gaslin was the judge who sentenced Print Olive to life imprisonment. See,
e.g., Osborne, The Olive Trial, in D. CREIGH, ADAMS COUNTY: A STORY OF THE
GREAT PLAINS 474 (1972); M. SANDOZ, THE CATTLEMEN 188-201 (1958). Gaslin
was the judge whose reaction to finding two men he had sentenced to hang dan-
gling from vigilante ropes was widely reputed to have been: "There is one case
that the Supreme Court will not reverse." J. HASKELL, JUDGE WILLIAM GASLIN:
NEBRASKA JURIST 41 (1983). And he was the judge who reacted to plans to in-
crease the number of district judges with a broadside delivered to the Nebraska
State Historical Society meekly entitled "Judicial Graft." Gaslin, Judicial Graft,
reprinted in J. HASKELL, supra, at 86-94. See generally Cordeal, William Gaslin,
4 NEB. L. BULL. 300 (1926); Thompson, Reminiscences of Judge Gaslin, 4 NEB. L.
BULL. 305 (1926).
5. State ex rel. Benton v. Elder, 31 Neb. 169, 47 N.W. 710 (1891)(Speaker of House
obligated to open and publish election returns); State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31
Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739 (1891)(elected governor ineligible to serve), rev'd, Boyd v.
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Still, however extraordinary the times and some of the partici-
pants, a lawyer schooled in the insurance law of the period would have
seen little noteworthy in the court's treatment of the failures of condi-
tion alleged in Fairbank. Forty-two years would pass before the Ne-
braska Law Bulletin would begin publishing casenotes,6 but even had
the Nebraska Law Review been positioned in 1891 "to highlight new
developments in the law and convey the significance of those develop-
ments,"7 Fairbank almost certainly would not have made the cut.
Fairbank's cow was not an unexpectedly fecund Rnse of AberloneS
and Fairbank did not give birth to a new line of insurance law. Both
the cow, and the law applied to her, were ordinary: she was not beaten
to death by her owner,9 nor was she hit by lightning while sojourning
in the wrong pasture,1 0 nor was she killed through the cumulative ef-
fects of covered "wind" and excluded "water"L-each a route to legal
immortality taken by a bovine or equine progenitor of Nebraska insur-
ance law.
Why, then, treat Fairbank as noteworthy today, even in an issue of
the Nebraska Law Review celebrating the centennial of the College of
Law? A lawyer reading the Fairbank opinion in conjunction with the
Nebraska Supreme Court's most recent ventures into the world of
Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892). The story of the election contests is
succinctly recounted in Nelson, Amasa Cobb, 14 NEB. L. BULL 197, 206-09 (1936).
For a more in-depth treatment, see 1 A. SHELDON, NEBRASKA: THE LAND AND
THE PEOPLE 696-702 (1931).
6. Volumes 1 and 2 of the NEBRASKA LAW BULLTIN were published by the College
of Law in 1922 and 1923, and were devoted exclusively to extensive essays on
selected areas of Nebraska law, prepared by members of the faculty. By 1924, the
NEBRASKA LAW BULLEIN had become an "Official Organ of the Nebraska State
Bar Association" and the University of Nebraska Section began to include notes
on "Recent Cases." The formal announcement of this development came with
the Report of the Committee on Legal Education, 3 NEB. L. BULL. 42-43 (1924),
and Professor Henry Foster's response, id. at 43-44. Case comments were to be
prepared "by the student editors with the advise and assistance of the faculty
editor and in some instances by the faculty editor alone." 3 NEB. L. BULL. 259
(1924). The NEBRASKA LAW BULLErIN became the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW in
1941.
7. The "purpose of a casenote," according to NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, WRITING A
NOTE (c. 1990).
8. See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568,33 N.W. 919 (1887)(mistake in fundamental
assumption ground for rescission).
9. See Western Horse & Cattle Ins. Co. v. O'Neill, 21 Neb. 548, 32 N.W. 581 (1887)
(implied exception from coverage where insured horse beaten to death by its
owner). See also Western Horse & Cattle Ins. Co. v. Timm, 23 Neb. 526, 37 N.W.
308 (1888)(implied exception if mules worked to death while plowing).
10. See Johnson v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 759, 251 N.W. 821 (1933)(location of
horse contributed to its death by lightning). See also Waters v. Nebraska Mut. Ins.
Co., 108 Neb. 1, 187 N.W. 125 (1922)(location clause construed to be affirmative
warranty).
11. See Lydick v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 187 Neb. 97, 187 N.W.2d 602 (1971)(exclu-
sion of damage caused by water construed to be purging condition).
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postloss insurance conditions-in the First Security casesl 2-- likely
would conclude that little of legal significance had changed. True,
quite different sorts of oxen were being gored by quite different sorts
of ill winds, but the failure to file timely proofs of loss apparently was
as fatal to the First Security claims as it had been to the Fairbank
claim, and apparently for the same reasons. And therein lies our tale.
What makes Fairbank noteworthy today is that its treatment of
postloss insurance conditions looks so normal-so unnoteworthy-to
modern eyes, despite a century of change in both insurance practice
and insurance law, and increasing ferment concerning the appropriate
treatment of postloss conditions.
A retrospective peek beneath the formal veneer of the Fairbank
opinion is a useful reminder that appellate opinions necessarily tell
only a part of the story. Omitted details-that Loren Fairbank was
one of the last "entrymen" to homestead the rolling farmland of Ve-
rona Township,13 that the boom years for land speculators and com-
mercial developers that preceded the School Children's Blizzard
mostly bypassed the farming community, 14 that the lawyer who repre-
sented Fairbank was one of Juniata's principal property insurance
agents,15 that the constable charged a nickel for service of process in
the justice court proceeding' 6-may well evoke a fuller appreciation of
the historic, economic, social, and human dimensions of the story, but
as lawyers we are conditioned by our training and by the practical de-
mands of our discipline to limit ourselves in our professional roles to
the formal "legal" history of the dispute. And so it should be. Ab-
straction and taxonomy and analogy are at the essence of law and
12. The First Security cases were part of the fallout from the failure of Common-
wealth Savings. First Security Savings v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 849 F.2d
345 (8th Cir. 1988), held that losses sustained by the insured financial institutions
as a result of illegal loans were not covered by "discovery" bonds written by the
defendant insurer because the losses were discovered before April, 1983, when the
bonds became effective. In First Sec. Bank & Trust v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d 188 (1989), and First Sec. Say. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d 596 (1989), efforts to recover against the insurers
who had written bonds for the period prior to April, 1983, also proved unavailing,
because (1) discovery had occurred after April, 1983, and thus after the bonds
expired; and (2) proofs of loss had not been submitted in timely fashion.
13. 1 PAST & PRESENT OF ADAMS COUNTY, NEBRASKA 459 (W. Burton & D. Lewis,
eds. 1916).
14. See generally D. CREIGH, supra note 4, at 19-36; J. OLSON, HISTORY OF NEBRASKA
ch. 17 (1955); A. SHELDON, supra note 5, at ch. XIX.
15. Juniata Herald, January 19, 1888.
16. Transcript at 2, Fairbank v. German Ins. Co. (Justice Ct., Sept. 27, 1888). "Justice
Fees" totaled $2.90: "Docketing and Summons" = $.75; "2 Filings" = .20; "Copy-
ing Return Officer" = .10; "Entering Judgment" = .50; "Oath to Witness" = .10;
"This Transcript" = $1.00; "Certificate" = .25. "Constables Fees" totalled $.80:
"Service and Return" = .50; "Copy" = .25; "Mileage" = .05.
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lawyering.17 Unfortunately, the habit of suppressing details of time
and place sometimes deadens recognition of significant differences of
time and place. We end up classifying Fairbank and the First Security
decisions together as validations of the same immutable, timeless rule;
the headnotes that determine how these appellate decisions appear in
the digests might as well be identical.' s And that's a shame. It's a
shame because appellate opinions, too, are located in time and place,
and the meanings we ascribe to them should at least take these differ-
ences into account.19 It should matter that Fairbank was decided one
hundred years ago, not because we need to understand the story
whole, but because viewing appellate opinions ahistorically not only
can get in the way of understanding their historical, social, and human
dimensions, but also can impede our understanding of the legal story
as well.
2 0
Of course. As lawyers we understand the difference between Fair-
bank and Fairbank, and we understand as well the distinctive ways
appellate opinions provide continuity between their pasts, present,
17. Fried, The Artfcial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv.
35, 57 (1981): "Analogy and precedent are the stuff of law because they are the
only form of reasoning left to the law when general philosophical structures and
deductive reasoning give out, overwhelmed by the mass of particular details."
Compare Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22 CONN. L. REV. 437
(1990)(normative indispensability of abstract principles) with L. FRIEDMAN, CON-
TRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-21, 97-98, 122-24, 189-91 (1965)(abstraction as historical
contingency of progressively limited importance). See generally E. LEvi, AN IN.
TRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
18. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 49 N.W. 711, headnote 4 (1891):
In an action upon the policy which provides that the insured should fur-
nish proofs of loss within a specified time after the loss occurred, it is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove upon the trial that the proofs were
made, or that the same were waived by the company.
First Sec. Say. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 325, 445 N.W.2d 596, head-
note 1 (1989):
In order for an insured to recover under a discovery bankers blanket
bond, the insured must establish that it... furnished the underwriter
proof of loss with full particulars within the time specified by the bond.
19. In the first-year law curriculum .... cases are normally treated like doc-
trinal fruits on a conceptual tree: some bulk large, some are almost insig-
nificant; some display a wondrous perfection of development, others are
shown to be rotten at the core; some are further out along conceptual
branches than others; but all are quite erroneously treated as though
they blossomed at the same time, and for the same harvest.
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STuD. 249 (1975). See also L. FRIEDmAN, supra note 17, at 3-11.
20. See White, The Appellate Opinion as Historical Source Material, 1 J. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY HIST. 491 (1971) [hereinafter White, The Appellate Opinion]. See also
White, Book Review, 59 VA. L. REv. 1130, 1135-36 (1973):
These pieces of information do more than satisfy an antiquarian curios-
ity. They provide us with antecedent reference points to which the law,
in its process of change, is continually recurring and thereby help to ex-
plain its anomalies and irregularities.
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and futures.2 1 But does a retrospective look at Fairbank in its histori-
cal setting offer anything besides a chance to dust off old manuscripts,
polish old verities about the uses of legal authority, and test the limits
of the Law Review's traditional insistence that noted cases be "cur-
rent"? Indeed, it does.
Several years ago, in the course of a survey of Nebraska property
and liability insurance law,22 I noted the Nebraska Supreme Court's
occasional use of what appeared to be a new "prejudice rule" for at
least some postloss insurance conditions-a potentially significant
deviation from the contracts orthodoxy that classifies most insurance
policy provisions as express conditions and, except where statutes
have altered things, subject to the common law rule that "express con-
ditions, whatever their nature, must under any and all circumstances
be literally performed"23-and wondered why in Nebraska it had sup-
planted the strict common law rule for some failures of postloss condi-
tions and not for others. More recently, in the course of the First
Security litigation, three major Nebraska law firms devoted over 140
pages of appellate briefs to debating whether a prejudice rule or the
strict common law rule should apply to failures to satisfy postloss con-
ditions in surety bonds.24 In these discussions, the prejudice rule ap-
pears as an alien form of legal growth, its seeds blown into Nebraska
from other jurisdictions, occasionally taking tentative root, but usually
failing to compete successfully with the established indigenous com-
mon law rule. Viewing the prejudice rule that way is limiting; it leads
to the legal equivalent of botanical surveys, faithfully recording the
appearance of this new bit of legal flora, but leaving to others an ex-
planation for why it has been able to establish a foothold one place and
not another. This retrospective on Fairbank seeks to provide what
those earlier efforts lack: an argument-this one25 essentially histori-
cal in its structure and content-for why a prejudice rule might appro-
21. See generally White, The Appellate Opinion, supra note 20. See also Hart & Mc-
Naughton, Evidence & Inference in the Law, 87 DAEDALUS 40, 41 (1958)("At the
moment of their making, they speak from the present to the future. At the mo-
ment of their application, they speak out of the past to the present.").
22. R. WORKS, NEBRASKA PROPERTY & LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW 83-91 (1985).
23. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 845-46 (2d ed.
1970).
24. Brief of Appellant 16-48, First Sec. Bank & Trust v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232
Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d 188 (1989) (No. 89-176); Brief of Appellee 10-15, 21-50, id.;
Reply Brief of Appellant 2-11, 16-22 id.; Brief of Appellant 18-50, First Sec. Sav. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d 596 (1989) (No. 87-897); Brief
of Appellee 7-19, 24-27, id.; Reply Brief of Appellant 1-14, id.
25. Of course, other arguments are possible. For example, in other work in progress,
I consider what light the neoinstitutionalist economic literature on "opportu-
nism" might shed on these and related phenomena. For a useful introduction to




priately displace the orthodox common law rule for some failures of
condition. By examining Fairbank in its historical setting, we may
learn to recognize the prejudice rule for what it is, a reflowering of
long-dormant but well-rooted traditions in Nebraska insurance law,
and with that recognition to develop a sense of where it should be al-
lowed to spread.
We begin in Part II with a look at the Fairbank decision, first
through modern eyes undistracted by details of context, and then
from a more proximate vantage, where things appear distinctly less
clear. In the process of looking at the way the Fairbank court treats
each of the three alleged failures of condition, we discover that Fair-
bank can appear ordinary from both perspectives, but for quite differ-
ent reasons. From a hundred years away, with the false clarity that
distance can bring, Fairbank can seem a simple application of the for-
mal contracts orthodoxy that express conditions must be fully satis-
fied; up close and fuzzy, Fairbank appears to subvert that orthodoxy
without directly confronting it.
Part III moves from discovery to explanation. Rather than treat
Fairbank's implicit subversions of the strict common law rule as aber-
rational lightning bolts from the judicial blue, it offers a broadly
limnied historical explanation for what we have learned of Fairbank
and its context, an explanation that finds its explicative design in a
recurring judicial and legislative concern with the overbreadth built
into standard insurance policy forms designed to control juridical haz-
ard. Part III then suggests how informing the prejudice rule with this
content provides a limiting principle that can guide the determination
of which policy provisions should be subject to a prejudice rule and
which should not.
II. THE FAIRBANK DECISION
The German Insurance Company's defense to Fairbank's claim was
simple: it had promised to indemnify Fairbank for loss to his cow only
if certain conditions were met, among them that Fairbank's insured
property not have been mortgaged, that suit be brought within six
months after the loss, and that proofs of loss be submitted within
thirty days of the loss. According to the insurer, Fairbank failed to
satisfy each of these conditions. The trial court disagreed, without ex-
plaining why.26 The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed. Each of the
three provisions established a condition precedent to the insurer's
26. The suit was brought in Justice Court, Juniata Precinct. A default judgment was
entered in favor of Fairbank. The insurer appealed to the district court; a trial de
novo before Judge Gaslin produced a judgment for Fairbank in the amount of
$58.88 ($30 principal amount of indemnity obligation under policy; $2.50 interest;
and $26.38 in costs taxed by the district court). Fairbank v. German Ins. Co., slip
op. at 1, (D. Ct. Adams Co., May 24, 1889).
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duty to pay. The record disclosed that the mortgage condition had
been satisfied, and that the suit condition had been satisfied, but there
was no indication that the proof of loss condition had been satisfied.
Thus, it was error for the trial court to hold that the insurer was obli-
gated to pay.
Viewed through standard-issue conceptual lenses ground in the
modem insurance law fashion, the Fairbank decision hardly seems
the stuff of which a law office history in support of a prejudice rule
might be built. In Fairbank, as in the First Security decisions, we can
see the court holding that the insured must lose because a proof of loss
condition was not satisfied. Then, as now, the text of the opinion
seems to be telling us that the only question for the court is whether
conditions precedent to the insurer's obligation have been satisfied.
Then, as now, there appears to be no room for inquiry into whether
the insurer was in any way prejudiced by a failure of condition. Then
as now, the simple mechanics of contracts conditions are treated as so
transparent that the consequences of a failure of condition can go
without saying: any noncompliance with a policy condition, no matter
how trivial, should be enough to prevent the insurer's obligation from
arising.27
But, of course, there is more to the story-more in the text of the
opinion, and even more in its subtext and context-than that.
27. H. WOOD, WOOD ON FIRE INSURANCE § 135, at 270 (1878), spelled out the conven-
tional understanding:
All the provisions of a policy, relating to the risk, are conditions prece-
dent, and, unless waived, must be strictly complied with, such as promis-
sory warranties, or conditions relating to increase or alteration of risk; to
the giving of notice, and presenting proofs of loss; the production of
builders, citizens or magistrates certificate of loss; as to the giving notice
of other insurance; and indeed, each and every condition of the policy
must be fully and strictly performed, before an action can be maintained
for a loss under the policy.
Insurance authorities traditionally have gone to considerable lengths to warn that
warranties, whether or not cast in terms explicitly conditional, were to be treated
as express conditions subject to the strict compliance requirement. As an early
treatise writer put it:
A warranty in a policy of insurance is regarded as a condition; that is, as
a stipulation upon the strict compliance or non-compliance with which
the validity of the policy depends. No substantial compliance with the
warranty, or performance of an equivalent act will avail the insured, or
render the underwriters liable, if the express terms of the contract be
infringed. It is immaterial whether the purpose intended by the war-
ranty has been answered or not; whether the loss was attributable to a
violation of the warranty, or to any other cause; ... if the terms of the
warranty be broken, the condition of the contract is violated, and the
underwriters are consequently discharged.




1. The Mortgage Condition
The policy issued to Fairbank declared that "if the property or any
part thereof... shall be incumbered by mortgage ... this policy shall
be absolutely void."28 Fairbank executed a series of mortgages, some
on the insured farm buildings, some on several insured horses, thus
apparently violating the provision. However, the Nebraska Supreme
Court concluded that the mortgages did not prevent recovery. The
policy allocated the policy limit of $1,150 among several internal lim-
its: $450 on the dwelling, household furniture, beds and bedding,
wearing apparel and sewing machine; $300 on horses and cattle, not
exceeding $100 on any one horse or $30 on any one of the cattle; and
$400 on the other personalty. The court read the policy as though it
contained separate insurer promises to indemnify for losses to each
class of property, each with its own associated conditions.
The policy having specified separate and distinct amounts upon the different
subjects of insurance, the contract is severable, and a breach of a condition of
the policy against incumbrances could only affect that class of property which
was covered by the incumbrance. The execution of the mortgages upon the
lands therefore only avoided the policy so far as it covered the buildings, and
did not in any manner affect the insurance upon the cattle.2 9
But Fairbank's mortgages were not limited to incumbrances on realty;
in early 1887, Fairbank had granted a chattel mortgage to a local
lender covering several head of horses. Could the policy be further
divided, as between different species of livestock? Of course, said the
court: "There is no claim that there had ever been any incumbrance
during the life of the policy, upon the cow that was killed, or upon any
of the cattle owned by the insured."3 0 Thus, Fairbank's mortgages did
not constitute a failure of condition precedent to the obligation of the
insurer to indemnify for losses to cattle. Thus, there was no reason for
the court even to discuss the consequences of a failure of a mortgage
condition. Simple enough.
Too simple. The "how" of the court's treatment of the mortgage
condition might seem consistent with the received common law rule
governing conditions, 3 ' but the "why" and the "when" of the court's
divisibility analysis are not. The insurer interpreted its obligation as
28. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 752-53, 49 N.W. 711, 712 (1891).
29. Id. at 753-54, 49 N.W. at 712.
30. Id. at 754, 49 N.W. at 712.
31. There was nothing innovative in the Nebraska Supreme Court's use of the divisi-
bility technique to render the mortgages irrelevant to Fairbank's claim. Two
years earlier, in State Ins. Co. v. Schreck, 27 Neb. 527, 4 N.W. 340 (1889), the court
divided a similar policy into separate coverages for personalty and realty in order
to avoid the consequences of a similar mortgage clause, and divisibility arguments
have been a staple of insurance law throughout its history. See generally R.
WORKS, supra note 22, at 99-103.
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"entire": "We will pay for covered losses to your insured property if
you have not mortgaged any of your insured property." The court in-
terpreted the insurer's obligations as several, each with associated con-
ditions: "We will pay for covered losses to your cows if you have not
mortgaged your cows; we will pay for covered losses to your horses if
you have not mortgaged your horses; ... ." Why, we may fairly ask,
should the court choose one interpretation over another? When, we
may wonder, should we anticipate that a policy will be interpreted as
divisible?
The court explained its interpretive choice this way:
Had [Fairbank] sold the horses it would not have affected the insurance on the
cattle. The fact that they were incumbered did not affect or render less valua-
ble the title of the insured in the cattle, nor was the risk on the cattle thereby
increased.
3 2
In other words, the court assumed that the insurer included the mort-
gage condition to respond to real insurer concerns. Mortgaging the
cattle would matter to an insurer of the cattle, in the court's common
sense calculus, because it would increase the moral hazard applicable
to the cattle-the likelihood that the insured would destroy the cattle
or be less careful with them. Thus, it makes sense for the insurer to
condition its coverage of the cattle on them being free from incum-
brances. But, by the same common sense calculus, mortgaging the
other property of the insured does not matter to an insurer of the cat-
tle--qua insurer of cattle-because such mortgages make the insured
no more likely to intentionally destroy the cattle or to be less careful
with them.
Thus, interpreting the Fairbank policy as divisible involves ascrib-
ing a purpose to the mortgage condition-understanding it to be a
moral hazard warranty designed to control moral hazards to which the
insurer otherwise might be exposed-and declaring that, as regards
Fairbank's dead cow, that purpose has been served. And, regardless of
whether the purpose ascribed is chosen well or badly,33 that is pre-
32. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 755, 49 N.W. 711, 713 (1891).
33. Recognizing that the mortgage condition is a reflection of insurer concerns about
moral hazard is only the first step in ascribing a purpose to the mortgage condi-
tion. A court might accept the insurer's implicit assumption that mortgaging one
horse is likely to make the insured less protective of that horse without assuming
also that mortgaging one horse is likely to make the insured less protective of his
other horses, or his cows. That is the basis of the Fairbank divisibility analysis. It
quickly becomes more complicated. Should a mortgage on the house prevent re-
covery for loss, not only to the house, but also to unscheduled property kept in
the house? The Fairbank policy classified these different species of property as
subject to different limits. If one understands the insurer's concern to be that
incumbrances on the house increase the moral hazard, then that concern might
be thought to extend not only to the house, but also to the contents, no matter
how the policy limits may be structured. Or does the insurer's use of separate
limits manifest its conclusion that the risks are separable? Cf. State Ins. Co. v.
[Vol. 70:229
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cisely what the strict common law rule governing the effect of failures
of condition purports to prohibit.3 4 Never mind that the black letter
rule insists that "it is immaterial whether the purpose intended by the
warranty has been answered or not."35 Never mind that the strict
common law rule makes irrelevant whether the breach prejudiced the
insurer. Never mind that the court could have concluded that the
drafter of the mortgage condition intended to exploit the strict com-
mon law rule and to give the insurer a defense whenever there was an
inumbrance, no matter how technical the failure of condition. In
1891 in Nebraska, Fairbank tells us if we are willing to listen, there is
no need to be self conscious about asking if a failure of condition
prejudiced the insurer, so long as the question can be dressed up in an
apparently technical doctrine like divisibility so that it appears to be
an inquiry into whether the condition was satisfied, rather than an
inquiry into the effect of a failure of condition on the insurer. By
adopting a purposive approach to the interpretive problem of deter-
mining what the mortgage condition required, the court collapses the
positivist conceit that the search for the meaning of the condition can
Schreck, 27 Neb. 527, 43 N.W. 340 (1889)(dividing policy between realty and per-
sonalty without apparent regard to whether the mortgage on the realty might
also have increased the risk of loss to the personalty).
Of course, divisibility analyses, even when driven by noncontroversial ascrip-
tions of purpose, can get fuzzy along the margin. Should the policy also be divisi-
ble by cause of loss, so that ascribing to the mortgage condition the purpose of
controlling moral hazard means that the presence of a mortgage on the insured
house will prevent recovery if it was destroyed by arson prompted in part by the
insured's reduced interest in the house, but not if it was destroyed by lightning?
Unless, of course, the insured's reduced interest in the house prompted him to
forego lightning rods, which would have .... In a passage that seemed to antici-
pate the public policy enshrined in the contribute to the loss statute, the Fair-
bank court indicated that it was willing to divide policies by cause of loss: "It
cannot be successfully claimed that the hazard of wind storms was increased by
the incumbrance on the property." German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750,755,
49 N.W. 711,712 (1891). For an example of another court willing to divide a policy
by cause of loss, see Diesinger v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1943).
For a suggestive overview of the process of ascribing purposes, see Nonet, The
Legitimation ofPurposive Decisions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1980).
34. See, e.g., 3 J. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE OF EVERY KIND
§ 1970, at 3234 (2d ed. 1917):
No departure can be allowed in the slightest particular in any matter
warranted. The very purpose and meaning of a warranty is to preclude
all questions for what purpose it was made, or whether it was made for
any purpose at all .... [Tihere is, says Lord Mansfield, no latitude, no
equity.
See also E. PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 61, at 239 (1935)("[Ihe
rule came down to this, practically: that the insurer's motives for inserting the
warranty would not be inquired into.").
35. D. HUGHES, supra note 27, at 308 (1833).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
be kept divorced from a consideration of its effects, and in the process
subverts the strict common law rule without having to confront it.
2. The Suit Condition
Fairbank's policy also required that the insured commence suit
within six months after the loss:
It is mutually agreed that no suit or action against this company upon this
policy shall be sustained in any court of law or equity, unless commenced
within six months after the loss or damage shall occur, and if any suit or ac-
tion shall be commenced after the expiration of said six months the lapse of
time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of
such claim, any statute of limitation to the contrary notwithstanding.
36
Loren Fairbank's cow died on January 12, 1888. On September 27,
1888, some eight months and fifteen days later, Fairbank brought suit
against the insurer. Nonetheless, according to the Nebraska Supreme
Court, the suit condition had been satisfied. The requirement that suit
be brought "within six months after the loss or damage shall occur"
was to be read together with a provision requiring that notice be given
immediately, a provision requiring that proofs of loss be given within
thirty days, and a provision requiring that the insurer's obligation to
pay be satisfied within 90 days after notice and proofs of loss had been
made.
It will be observed that ... [the insurer] did not become liable to pay the loss
until ninety days after the making of the proofs of loss. The money was not
due, and the holder of the policy could not have lawfully demanded payment
until that time had elapsed. No suit, therefore, could have been commenced
prior to the expiration of ninety days after the loss, and it is well settled that
the period of limitation will not commence to run until the cause of action
accrues. The fair and reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the policy,
when construed together, is that the limitation of six months did not begin to
run from the date of loss, but from the time the suit could have been
brought.
3 7
Thus, a suit brought eight and one-half months after the cow was de-
stroyed satisfied a policy provision requiring that suit be brought
"within six months after the loss or damage shall occur."
Because this result also is cast as the product of interpretation, it
too involves no direct confrontation with the strict common law rule.
The court does not have to say that a delay of two and one-half months
did not prejudice the insurer. Nor does it have to read "loss" as ambig-
uous so that it can use the contra proferentem tie-breaker to select
the alternative meaning most favorable to the insured. Instead, once
again, the critical move by the court comes as part of the process of
interpreting the policy language. The court's interpretation involves
an ascription of a particular purpose for the policy provision; under-
36. German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 755, 49 N.W. 711, 713 (1891).
37. Id. at 756, 49 N.W. at 713.
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standing it not as a simple repose provision designed to establish an
independent outer limit to the insurer's exposure to suit, but as a con-
tractual shortening of the statute of limitations (with its additional
aims of discouraging claimants from sleeping on their rights and pro-
tecting the judicial process from error and manipulation), permits the
court to use accrual of the claim rather than death of the cow as the
trigger for the start of the six month period. Once again, the alterna-
tive interpretation, that the provision was intended to act as a repose
provision, and thus to be "strictly performed," is rejected. Once again,
the court is able to subvert the strict common law rule without even
mentioning it.
3. The Proofs of Loss Condition
Fairbank's policy also required that proofs of loss be made within
thirty days of the loss. The petition alleged that all conditions had
been satisfied, and the insurer responded with a general denial. No
evidence was introduced at trial concerning whether the proofs of loss
were ever made. The issue was not briefed on appeal. Nonetheless,
the court held that Fairbank's failure to prove he had made timely
proofs of loss meant that the district court's judgment in Fairbank's
favor must be reversed.
Here, at least, it might appear that the orthodox law of conditions
still had teeth. The trial court decision was reversed because there
was no showing that the proof of loss condition had been met. That
fact alone was enough to prevent recovery. No inquiry was required,
or permitted, into whether the insurer was prejudiced by the failure.
But here, too, the more we learn of Fairbank and its context, the
less secure the strict common law rule appears. Fairbank turned on a
failure of proof. The record did not show that Fairbank had satisfied
the proof of loss provision. But neither did it show that Fairbank was
late in his proofs of loss, or that his proofs of loss were defective, or
that he had lied in his proofs of loss. The district court decision was
reversed, and the case remanded. What happened thereafter is lost to
history. But what history does tell us is that even a clear-cut determi-
nation that the insured had failed to make the proofs of loss in a
timely fashion would not necessarily have ended the matter. Even in
1891 there was available in Nebraska law and elsewhere the raw
materials and the tradition of using them that might have permitted
Fairbank to escape from the orthodox failure of postloss condition
analysis.
In 1891, as now, there was no question that postloss conditions like
the proof of loss provision were to be treated as conditions precedent
to the insurer's duty to pay. McCann v. Aetna Insurance Co.,38 the
38. 3 Neb. 198 (1874).
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first appellate insurance decision in Nebraska, made that clear.
Barely months later, however, in the second Nebraska appellate insur-
ance decision, Continental Insurance Co. v. Lippold,39 the court al-
ready was shrinking from the conventional implications of that
classification. In Lippold, a policy provision required immediate no-
tice after loss; Lippold was slow to comply. Nonetheless, said the
court, the notice was immediate enough to satisfy the condition. Why?
Because "it is a sufficient compliance with the condition of a policy,
requiring notice of loss to be given 'forthwith' or 'immediately,' that
the party has used due diligence under all the circumstances."4
0
Moreover, "[t]he clause in a policy as to preliminary proofs, notice,
etc., should always be construed with great liberality; and it only re-
quires reasonable information to be given so that the company may be
enabled to form some estimate of its rights and duties before it is obli-
gated to pay."41 Thus, whether the notice had been given "immedi-
ately" turned on whether the insured had been unreasonably dilatory
and on the effects of the delay in notifying the insurer. Once again,
purposive interpretation defangs the strict common law rule. Once
again, the court refuses to ascribe to the insurer the purpose of using
the policy language in conjunction with the strict common law rule to
provide itself with a purely "technical" defense. As the Lippold court
summarized:
A contract of insurance, like other contracts, should receive, if possible, such
construction as will carry it into effect. The insurer having received the con-
sideration for assuming the risk, there is no reason why he should be dis-
charged from liability in case of loss, on slight or merely technical grounds.4 2
In the years between Lippold and Fairbank, the Nebraska
Supreme Court made it clear that its unwillingness to apply the strict
common law rule to postloss conditions was not limited to efforts to
interpret malleable adverbs like "immediately." Did the insured vio-
late a postloss condition requiring that he include with his proofs a
certificate of "a magistrate... nearest the place of the fire" by submit-
ting a certificate from the wrong magistrate? No problem. Where "an
honest effort was made to comply with the policy," and the insurer's
"objections to the proof of loss as furnished were technical, and appar-
ently not prompted by a desire to know the real facts," the court
would make sure that "no merely technical objection, not materially
affecting the risk, [was] available as a defense." 43 Did the insured will-
fully exaggerate the amount of loss in his proof of loss, thus appar-
ently violating a policy condition declaring the policy void if the
39. 3 Neb. 391 (1874).
40. Id. at 395.
41. Id. at 396.
42. Id. at 397.




insured engaged in fraud or false swearing? "This is reprehensible,
but if no one is defrauded thereby it is difficult to perceive any just
ground upon which to base a forfeiture."44 Did the insured submit
proof of loss to the general agent, rather than to the insurer, as re-
quired by the policy? "While proof of loss must be furnished, all that
the law requires is a substantial compliance with that provision." 45
Small wonder, then, that the attorneys briefing the case for the in-
surer in Fairbank turned to a non-insurance decision 46 for their au-
thority for the general proposition that non-compliance with a
condition means that the conditional duty does not arise. And small
wonder that a leading insurance treatise of the period cites Fairbank
for the proposition that "[a]lthough a failure to make proofs of loss
within the stipulated time does not cause a forfeiture of the policy, it is
necessary that proofs be submitted before an action can be main-
tained." 47 But, then, the decisions tell us, even that was not necessar-
ily true: even a complete failure to submit the proofs of loss would not
bar recovery if the failure was excused due to waiver,48 breach by the
insurer,49 or impracticability.5 0
44. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Winn, 27 Neb. 649, 654, 43 N.W. 401, 402
(1889).
45. Insurance Co. of N.A. v. McClimans & Coyle, 28 Neb. 653, 657-58, 44 N.W. 991,
991-92 (1890). The court continued-
A party who in good faith has insured his property, and paid the pre-
mium demanded for that purpose, may reasonably expect that the in-
surer will also act in good faith, and, upon receiving notice and proof of
the loss, promptly adjust and pay the same. Technical objections ought
not to be sustained to defeat the right ....
Id at 658, 44 N.W. at 992.
46. Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb. 50 (1876). Livesey was the only Nebraska
decision cited by the insurer. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 8, German Ins. Co. v.
Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750,49 N.W. 711 (1891). Fairbank's attorney did not file a brief.
47. C. ELUoTr, A TREATmSE ON THE LAW OF INSURANcE § 307, at 317 (1907).
48. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 30 Neb. 135,46 N.W. 292 (1890) (failure of
condition waived because objections to defective proof of loss were not specific).
49. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder, 32 Neb. 490, 49 N.W. 217 (1891)(absolute denial of
liability by insurer waives compliance with proof of loss condition); Nebraska &
Iowa Ins. Co. v. Seivers, 27 Neb. 541, 43 N.W. 351 (1889)(same).
50. In Nebraska, the fountainhead decision excusing failure of a postloss condition on
the basis of impracticability was still a decade away. In Woodmen Accident Ass'n
v. Pratt, 62 Neb. 673, 87 N.W. 547 (1901), the Nebraska court aligned itself with a
long line of impracticability decisions from other states, and in the process deliv-
ered what may well have been the court's most ringing denunciation of technical
failure of condition defenses, and its most straightforward statement of the goal
of judicial efforts to ascribe purposes to policy provisions:
The defense is purely technical. The risk assumed by the insurer has
not been increased or in anywise jeoparded by the failure of the insured
to comply literally with the provisions for notice .... If the provision
quoted must under all circumstances and regardless of conditions be ab-
solutely and strictly complied with according to the letter thereof, then
the contract can only be regarded as a snare and pitfall sure to entrap the
unwary and deprive them of the protection and indemnity contracted for
1991]
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B. Fairbank Located
And so? Does unbuttoning Fairbank to find its underpinnings
show us more than we think we want to see? How should we under-
stand the tension between the received law of conditions and the re-
sults actually being reached?5 1 From a century away, with more
recent decisions to reassure us that the strict common law rule still
can have teeth when applied to postloss conditions, it is tempting to
see in Fairbank only anachronistic aberrations, perhaps to be chalked
up to Populist passions of the period, or to the inadequacies of law
practiced without Lexis, Westlaw, and the calming certitudes of a one-
volume edition of Williston.
on their part in the best of faith and honesty of purpose .... There is,
presumably, pervading every contract a reason based on something sub-
stantial, capable of conception and analysis by the human mind, for the
terms and conditions mentioned and prescribed therein ....
Id. at 677-78, 87 N.W. at 548.
51. Roscoe Pound, while sitting as Commissioner for the Nebraska Supreme Court,
described the situation this way:
inhere has been a contest between the courts on the one hand and coun-
sel for insurance companies on the other, the latter devising skillfully
framed clauses and provisions, and the former largely thwarting the pur-
pose of these clauses by construing them strictly against the insurer. It
cannot be denied that not a little subtlety has been displayed on both
sides of this contest.
German Ins. Co. v. Shader, 68 Neb. 1, 8, 93 N.W. 972, 975 (1903). The quotation is
sometimes invoked in support of the proposition that the tension reflects a battle
of wits rather than a struggle over substance, but that seems an inapt characteri-
zation of both the decisions and the Pound quotation. For another explanation
from the same era, this one from within the industry, see C. GROSS, Insurance
Law, in 2 YALE INSURANCE LECTURES: FIRE AND MIscELLANEous 329, 347-349
(1903):
The chaotic condition of insurance law since 1800 is due very largely
to the failure of the lawyers, courts, and juries, and oftentimes of the
legislatures, to recognize the true principles of indemnity. Insurance
law, as it has been manufactured in the United States at least, has been
largely a chapter in the law of contracts for the reason that most cases
have turned on the interpretation of the provisions of the policy. Until
within a few years, every insurance company formulated a policy to suit
itself, containing innumerable conditions, both precedent and subse-
quent, often inconsistent with each other, confusing to the insured, diffi-
cult to interpret, and very obnoxious to the public generally.
The result up until about 1880 was a general hostility to any insur-
ance company that defended a case in court. The companies as a class
were largely to blame for this. Many companies contested every loss in
which a shrewd lawyer could devise a defense on the facts, or raise a
doubt as to the construction of the policy. The greater the number of
defenses, the stronger each was regarded as becoming. This course of
dealing with the insured prejudiced the general public, from whom ju-
ries are drawn, and the general atmosphere of the courtroom was full of
suspicion and, often unbelief. This prejudice extended to the judges, and
a reputable company with a perfectly valid defense often had difficulty
in obtaining an impartial trial.
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A closer look suggests that those are temptations that should be
resisted. Doubtless there was room for insurance companies, espe-
cially foreign insurers, among the "interests" aligned on the wrong
side of the Populists' Manichean universe, and eventually anticompact
legislation52 would be enacted and the insurance regulatory structure
would be bolstered.5 3 But in the years immediately prior to 1891 the
expressed grievances that drove the agrarian discontent focused less
on insurers5 4 than on the more traditional antagonists: the railroads,
mortgage lenders, tariffs, taxation, and the appreciation of the dol-
lar.55 Nor is it easy to force the Fairbank judges into Populist garb;5 6
there is no reason to think that the Political Revolution of 1890 had
made its way into the Nebraska Supreme Court chambers by 1891.
What is more, the judicial disinterest in applying the strict common
law rule to postloss conditions was not a sporadic thing, nor did it sud-
denly flower with the rise of the Populists; it had been a persistent
feature of Nebraska insurance law from the third volume of the Ne-
52. 1897 Neb. Laws ch. 81 §§ 1-4.
53. In 1899 the Nebraska Legislature created the Department of Insurance and made
the Governor the Commissioner of Insurance. 1899 Neb. Laws ch. 47. Prior to
that, from 1873 to 1899, the Auditor of Public Accounts and the attorney general
had some minimal supervisory responsibilities over insurers.
54. In 1889, the Nebraska Legislature did adopt valued policy legislation over the
determined opposition of the insurance industry. 1889 Neb. Laws ch. 48 § 1.
55. See generally J. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT (1931); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE
OF REFORM 60-81 (1955); J. OLSEN, supra note 14, at chs. 17-18; S. PARSON, THE
POPULIST CONTEX. RURAL vERsus URBAN POWER ON A GREAT PLAINS FRONTIER
(1973); N. POLLACK, THE POPULIST MIND (1967). See also Farmer, The Economic
Background of Frontier Populism, 10 MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HIST. REV. 406 (1924).
56. Judge Theopolis Lincoln Norval, the author of the supreme court opinion, was a
Republican stalwart whose nomination and election to the Nebraska Supreme
Court were widely regarded as engineered by the Union Pacific Railroad. 1 A.
SHELDON, supra note 5, at 661. The popular perception had not changed by the
election of 1895, where he was subjected to venomous attacks by the Populists.
For a systematic and sympathetic portrait, see F. LANDIS, LnE AND JUDICIAL CA-
REER OF T.L. NORVAL (1937). General Cobb, the Chief Justice, "had long been a
favorite of the railroads," though when he was defeated for renomination at the
Republican convention in 1891, some saw the railroads' hands in that as well. See
generally Nelson, supra note 5. Judge Gaslin, the trial judge, was forced from the
bench in the Populist landslide in 1893. See generally J. HASKELL, supra note 4.
Only Judge Maxwell had any association with the Populists, and that did not
come until 1895, after he had served twenty-one years on the court as a Republi-
can. "Substantial Justice Maxwell" was dumped by the Republicans in 1893, sup-
posedly because his anticorporate bias had contributed to decisions unfavorable to
railroads. He was the unsuccessful Populist nominee for the court in 1895 (he lost
to Judge Norval), and was elected to Congress in 1896 as a Silver Republican
Fusionist. R. CHERNY, POPULISM, PROGRESsSM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NEBRASKA POLITICS, 1885-1915, 44, 48, 86 (1981). For an especially strong charac-
terization of Maxwell's "anti-monopoly attitude," see 3 J. MORTON & A. WAT-
KINS, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 104 (1913); for a more balanced view,
see R. ROWLEY, SAMUEL MAXWELL, DEAN OF NEBRASKA JURISPRUDENCE (1928).




Even more telling, however, is what the treatises of the day had to
say about these matters.5 8 Though Fairbank's treatment of the mort-
gage clause by itself might be viewed as an idiosyncratic interpretation
directly at odds with the intent of the drafters, in fact, by the turn of
the century it was widely recognized that the courts "quite generally"
took the Fairbank view,59 and commentators reported that conditions
57. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Lippold, 3 Neb. 391 (1874). For a recitation of a similar
history in Wisconsin, see S. KmBALL, INSURANCE & PUBUC POLICY 209-15 (1960).
Judge Maxwell's dual role in the creation of the early Nebraska law of
postloss conditions bears noting. In a succession of editions of his A TREATISE ON
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, SHERIFFS, CORONERS, AND
CONSTABLES IN THE STATE OF NEBRASKA (subtitled "Together with a Concise
Statement of the Law Relating to Accord and Satisfaction, Animals .... Insur-
ance. ... Etc., Etc."), he quoted his own Lippold language inveighing against for-
feitures based on technical failures of condition; in the 6th edition, published in
1894, the quotation from Lippold was followed by this note:
A contract of insurance entered into in good faith by the parties, and the
premium paid, should be enforced. If the loss was not the act of the
insured with intent to destroy the property and recover the amount of
the policy, no merely technical objection should be permitted to defeat a
recovery. The company has received and retains the consideration for
the insurance and should be required to perform its contract. Where the
policy requires the proof of loss to be made within a specified time after
the loss occurs there must be a substantial compliance with the provi-
sion, unless it is waived. [German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 757
(1891)]. But where the insurance company denies absolutely its liability
on the ground that the policy was not in force it will be considered a
waiver of proof of loss. [Phenix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder, 32 Neb. 490, 494
(1891)]. The safe course, however, is to make proof of loss.
S. MAXWELL, A TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE, SHERIFFS, CORONERS, AND CONSTABLFS IN THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 649-50
n.2 (6th ed. 1894).
58. In the years leading up to Fairbank, when lawyers cited treatises to the court,
they were insurance treatises, not contracts treatises, and they generally treated
the strict common law rule as the rule in substance as well as form. See, e.g., D.
HUGHES, supra note 27, at 308; H. WOOD, supra note 27, § 135, at 270. Later insur-
ance treatises reacted to anomalies that could not be reconciled with the strict
rule in one of two fashions. Some, in the manner still on display in both special-
ized insurance and generalized legal encyclopedias, managed to signal the tension
without facing up to its implications. Thus, it is possible to find commentators
unblushingly reciting the strict rule cheek and jowl with fundamentally subver-
sive directives to search for the purpose of the policy provision. As intellectual
fashions changed, and the taxonomic search for patterns of treatment of "opera-
tive facts" came into vogue, treatise writers began to report that the strict com-
mon law rule was a better guide to results in some settings than in others, and
thus to classify insurance policy provisions in terms of their relative vulnerability
to judicial techniques that avoided a literal application of policy language. See,
eg., 3 J. JOYCE, supra note 34, § 1971, at 3238 (section entitled "Is there a ten-
dency to relax [the strict common law rule]?").
59. See, e.g., E. HARDY, FIRE INSURANCE LAW 49-50 (1918)(characterizing the pen-
chant of courts to treat moral hazard warranties as divisible as "one of the two
cases where the courts have ruled differently on the standard policy than the
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dealing with limited interests, incumbrances, and alienation were not
receiving the judicial respect the strict common law rule seemed to
require.60
In much the same fashion, what in isolation might appear to be
creative interpretive legerdemain by the Fairbank court to transform
a six-month suit condition into an eight and one-half month suit condi-
tion turns out to be an established interpretive turn.61 And, we dis-
cover, the rough treatment the Nebraska Supreme Court accorded
postloss conditions and the strict common law rule was not a phenom-
enon limited to Nebraska or even to midwestern hotbeds of an-
ticorporation animus.62 Indeed,
[drafters] desired or even planned"). See also G. RICHARDS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF INSURANCE §§ 116 & 246, at 154, 305 (3d ed. 1929); Patterson, Warranties
in Insurance Law, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 595, 629 (1934); Notes, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 65
(1912); Recent Decisions, 11 CoLum. L. REv. 685 (1911); Recent Cases, 14 HARV. L.
REV. 301 (1900); Recent Important Decisions, 8 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1909).
60. See W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE §§ 158-161, at 442, 454
(1904). In Vance's view:
Some courts have taken the view that the comprehensive terms of [the
change in interest, title, or possession condition] necessarily include any
changes whatever in the insured's interest, but the majority of the
courts, induced either by precedents construing older, less comprehen-
sive forms, or moved by a determination not to permit a merely technical
defeat of a contract entered into in good faith by the insured, have shown
a strong inclination to except from the operation of this condition such
immaterial changes of interest as do not diminish the value of that inter-
est or increase the moral hazard of the risk.
Id. at 450 (footnote omitted). See also C. ELLIOr, supra note 47, §§ 257-282, at
241-79; G. RICHARDS, supra note 59, §§ 261-268, at 340-356. CY Grable v. German
Ins. Co., 32 Neb. 645,49 N.W. 713 (1891)(decision filed same day as Fairbank hold-
ing contract for sale of insured property did not violate condition prohibiting
changes in title or interest).
61. See W. VANCE, supra note 60, § 191, at 507-10 (reporting that "probably a majority
of the courts came to hold that the specified period did not begin to run until a
right of action accrued"); C. ELLIOTT, supra note 47, § 330, at 360-61 (collecting
authorities for "two directly opposing lines of authorities," and citing Fairbank
for the proposition that time begins to run under a suit provision when a right to
bring the action exists); G. RICHARDS, supra note 59, § 300, at 408 (collecting au-
thorities for this "unsatisfactory and strained construction").
Changing the policy language from "after the loss" to "after the fire" did not
force the court to change its interpretation. See German Ins. Co. v. Davis, 40 Neb.
700,59 N.W. 698 (1894)(period begins to run when right of action accrues). Other
jurisdictions agreed. See W. VANCE, supra note 60, § 191, at 509 n.182 (collecting
authorities).
Eventually, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided that the condition was abso-
lutely void as contrary to public policy. Miller v. State Ins. Co., 54 Neb. 121, 74
N.W. 416 (1898); Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Drennan, 56 Neb. 623, 77 N.W. 67 (1898).
62. See, eg., G. RICHARDS, supra note 59, § 296, at 402 (detailing reasons why proofs of
loss, though of great importance to the insurer, as "to matters of mere detail" and
"mere matters of form relating to an estimate of loss already sustained should not
be too punctiliously insisted upon by the courts"). See also W. VANCE, supra note
60, §§ 184-189, at 497 (1904):
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[t]he provisions of the insurance contract fall naturally into two classes sepa-
rated by the fact of loss. While all provisions are valid and binding upon the
parties, they are not for purposes of construction treated as of equal impor-
tance. It is apparent that matters required to be done by the insured after the
capital fact of loss should not be construed with the same strictness as those
which define and limit the terms of the contract itself.
6 3
And so? What do we know once we know that sometimes the strict
common law rule proves not so strict, and that the classifiers tell us its
hegemony has been challenged more often in some areas than in
others? We know at least that understanding Fairbank and the his-
tory of which it is emblematic requires something more than an ac-
cumulation of such details. History is not, except in the most trivial of
senses, old facts, even well chosen, well classified, old facts. A usable
history responsive to modern questions requires an explicative inter-
pretation sensitive to both perspective and context. By the same to-
ken, insurance law ought to be something more than decisions
classified according to their operative facts. A usable law of insurance
able to mediate the tension between the banal generalized formal
rules and the buzzing confusions that immersion in detail discloses re-
quires an understanding of the legal and business traditions from
which such decisions derive.
In Part III of this Article I offer one version of such a broadly
limned historical explanation for what we have learned of Fairbank
and its context, and of how that fits into a longer view of the history of
this part of insurance and insurance law. Without the guidance of
such an argument-a theory of what the courts are doing-Fairbank
and its ilk are likely to appear unprincipled and unpredictable, light-
ning bolts from the judicial blue that understandably leave lawyers
and insurers to wonder whether it was the message of the policy provi-
sion, the way it was presented, or some unprincipled search for a deep
All those conditions of the policy making requirements of the insured
after loss are intended merely for evidential purposes, and do not prop-
erly form any part of the conditions of liability. That the insurer should
have the evidence that he stipulates for is most reasonable and proper,
and it is also reasonable that he should be allowed to stipulate for a pen-
alty to be imposed upon the insured if he fails to give the evidence re-
quired by the contract. But all of these conditions concern matters after
the loss. When they contain provisions of forfeiture they must be re-
garded as penalties defeating a right that has already accrued. Such be-
ing the nature of these conditions, it is manifest that the general rules of
construction require that they shall be construed with much less strict-
ness than those conditions that operate prior to the loss. A condition
subsequent should never be construed as defeating an already vested
right, unless the intention of the parties to create a forfeiture is unques-
tionable. In accordance with these principles, we find the majority of the
courts most unwilling to give such a construction to these subsequent
conditions as will defeat the rights of the insured, unless the facts of the
case show fraud or clear injustice to the insurer.
63. C. ELLIOTr, supra note 47, § 302, at 308.
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pocket that prompted the judicial refusal to enforce the policy provi-
sion as written.64
The lightning metaphor is apt for reasons that go beyond its ability
to capture the sporadic and apparently unpredictable character of
such judicial interventions. Lightning, modem science tells us, is not
the spiteful trick of capricious gods once imagined by our ancestors. It
is a natural phenomenon with physical causes that can be studied and
understood. What is more, despite the conventional wisdom to the
contrary, lightning does not really strike at random. Recognition that
some locations have proved especially susceptible to lightning has put
scientists to work trying to identify those locations, and to isolate their
common features, in order to predict where defensive measures are
especially appropriate.65
So too with judicial decisions that refuse to require that standard
insurance policy form provisions be literally performed. Judicial regu-
lation of standard forms, modern contracts theory tells us, need not
mean unprincipled judicial overreaching. Properly practiced, such ju-
dicial oversight rests on recognition that some provisions in standard
forms lack the validation of actual agreement assumed by orthodox
contract theory, and thus should be enforced only to the extent that
their provisions can survive substantive judicial review.66 While the
theorists of standard forms have provided little explicit guidance con-
cerning the standards that such judicial review should employ, and
64. Such uncertainties have prompted generations of handwringing, much of it per-
versely collected and preserved in the introductions to insurance law casebooks.
"What do they know of the law of the insurance contract who only the law of
contract know?" asked Professor Woodruff long ago. E. WOODRUFF, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1924). Not much, other casebook
authors hasten to warn. Professors York and Whelan declare, "Welcome to the
wonderful world of Insurance. In it the rules of the law of Contracts are re-
flected as in a fun house mirror." K. YORK & J. WHELAN, INSURANCE LAW xv
(1982). And listen to J. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW xix (2d ed. 1989): '"The area of
Insurance Law is a world unto itself. While theoretically it is merely an enclave
of contract law, it is like a mine field, full of hidden traps for those who expect
that words in a contract will be applied according to their usual meanings." As
usual, Professor Keeton deserves the last word: "[Tihe favorite generalization
advanced by outside observers to explain a judgment against an insurance com-
pany at variance with policy provisions is the ambivalent, suggestive, and wholly
unsatisfactory aphorism: 'It's an insurance case."' R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAw § 6.1, at 341 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Lightning Study Sparks a News Flash, Washington Post, June 27, 1985,
at A15, col. 1.
66. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); 3 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 559A-559I (Kaufman Supp. 1984); Leff, Contract as
Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Dem-
ocratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971). For a useful
application of these developments in mainstream contract theory to the special
problems of standard insurance policy forms, see Note, A Common Law Alterna-
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insurance scholars have done only slightly better,67 legal observers
have long recognized that judicial lightning is more likely to strike
some sorts of policy provisions than others. Consequently, we might
consider the tasks for students of insurance law, as for students of
lightning, to be: (1) to identify the sorts of policy provisions that have
proved especially vulnerable to judicial interventions; and (2) to de-
velop explanations for why these provisions so often are singled out
for rough treatment.68
The next Part is an effort of the latter sort. It takes as its starting
point the wide-spread recognition among insurance commentators
that moral hazard conditions69 and postloss conditions70 like the mort-
gage condition and proof of loss condition involved in Fairbank histor-
ically have been especially likely to receive less-than-enthusiastic
judicial receptions, and argues that these apparently unrelated pock-
ets of judicial activity reflect a common judicial concern with policy
provisions that seek to control the "juridical hazard" to which insurers
would otherwise be subject. Thus, the thesis is a simple one: Policy
provisions drafted to minimize "juridical hazard" are especially vul-
nerable to judicial scrutiny, because they carry the potential for de-
fenses based on a "merely technical objection, not materially affecting
the risk."71 That explanation, if accepted, should be a reassuring one,
for a significant part of what novices, skeptics, and insurance company
retainers regard as judges playing fast and loose with policy language
is really purposive interpretation that limits policy overbreadth
designed by insurers as a defense against "juridical hazard."
III. LEGAL CONTROL OF JURIDICAL HAZARD PROVISIONS
A. What Are "Juridical Hazard" Provisions?
Standard insurance policy forms function to define and to control
the risk transferred to the insurer. In the conventional theoretical
tive to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982).
For a discussion of how these themes play in Nebraska, see R. WORKS, supra
note 22, at ch. 2.
67. The two most important efforts are Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1281 (1970) and Young, Insurance
Policy Defenses: In Search of Restatements, 34 ARK. L. REV. 507 (1981).
68. See generally Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract" A Few Sug-
gestions for Further Study, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoRs. 376 (1950).
69. See generally E. PATTERSON, supra note 34, § 68, at 280-90; Goble, The Moral Haz-
ard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 410 (1937);
Patterson, supra note 59.
70. See generally E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 95-103, at 483-525
(2d ed. 1957); Morris, Waiver & Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 925 (1957).
71. German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 510, 41 N.W. 406, 407 (1889).
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literature of insurance, that risk is treated as composed of "physical
hazard" and "moral hazard."72 The absence of "juridical hazard" from
these accounts is understandable. In a theoretical world of perfect in-
formation and frictionless contracting, "physical hazard" and "moral
hazard" adequately suimmarize insurer concerns. In the real world,
however, the insurer must deal with yet another problem: "juridical
hazard," the concerns that attend recognition that insurance policy
provisions are not self executing.73 If the insurer's underwriting by
policy provision is to operate as the insurer intends, the policy provi-
sions must be properly understood, the facts properly ascertained, and
the claim properly evaluated. As any adjuster or insurance lawyer
will affirm, that does not occur automatically. Judgment and discre-
tion are essential. Ultimately, of course, "the law has the last word as
to the risks assumed by the insurer, and the law speaks through courts
and through juries, which are fallible even if not biased."74 When
push comes to shove, an insurer is concerned not so much with
whether the insured house will be destroyed by fire as it is with
whether destruction of the house by fire will result in insurer liability.
Thus, it is not surprising that insurance practice displays appreciation
of juridical hazard even though much of the theoretical literature does
not. Insurance policies routinely are drafted to control not only physi-
cal and moral hazards, but also juridical hazard.
A simple example may help to clarify how policy drafting can at-
tempt to minimi e juridical hazard. An insurer who wishes to be free
of the physical and moral hazards posed by buildings that sit vacant
for extended periods might provide in its policies that the insurer shall
72. See, e.g., H. DENENBERG, R. EILERs, G. HoFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELANE, H.
SNIDER, Risx & INSURANCE 8 (1964). Physical hazard are physical conditions
that increase the likelihood or severity of loss; in property insurance, physical
hazards traditionally have been treated as composed of construction hazards, oc-
cupancy hazards, protection hazards, and exposure hazards. Moral hazards, in
the traditional insurance understanding, include any characteristics of the in-
sured that might increase the likelihood or severity of loss. See also 2
W. GEPHART, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE: FIRE 89 (1917)(discussing physical
hazards).
73. In the legal literature, the best treatment of "juridical hazard" is provided by E.
PATTERSON, supra note 34, § 53, at 200, §§ 66-69, at 272-98; in the insurance litera-
ture, the most suggestive discussions are those which focus on the effects of infor-
mational deficiencies and asymmetries. A recent survey can be found in D.
LEREAH, INSURANCE MARKETS: INFORMATION PROBLEMs AND REGULATION 56-62
(1985).
74. E. PATTERSON, supra note 34, § 53, at 200. Patterson continued:
If the elements of coverage were unambiguously defined and if the in-
sured fully understood and honestly abided by them, or even if all the
facts were indisputably ascertained and the terms of the contract infalli-
bly applied by court and jury, insurers could get along with fewer condi-
tions. These "ifs" are violent assumptions ....
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not be liable for loss "caused by" the described building remaining va-
cant for more than sixty days. However, the standard fire policy does
not read that way, and for good reason. In order to establish a defense
under a provision excepting from coverage losses caused by an ex-
tended vacancy, the insurer would be required to show not only that
the described building had remained vacant for longer than permitted
by the policy, but also that the vacancy "caused" the loss. Needless to
say, demonstrating the necessary causal nexus between the vacancy
and the loss can prove messy. The facts may be difficult to establish,
legal standards governing causal inquiries always seem to be in flux,
and ascriptions of causal responsibility by triers of fact are notoriously
difficult to predict. Insurers have sought to minimize such juridical
problems by employing a simple bit of drafting. The loss is not cov-
ered, the policy says, if the loss occurred "while" the house was vacant
beyond a period of sixty consecutive days. With this minor change, an
insurer can try to substitute a relatively simple demonstration that the
home was vacant for the much more difficult demonstration that the
vacancy caused the loss, and thus hope to reduce the juridical hazard
to which it otherwise would be exposed.75
The orthodox law of contracts neatly reinforces such policy draft-
ing. In the world of fully bargained agreements hypothesized by sim-
ple contracts models, parties should be permitted to allocate risks
(including risks attributable to juridical hazards) however they
choose. If one party promises to pay if the building burns, but not if
the building burns "while" the building has been vacant for more than
sixty days, the fact of vacancy for more than sixty days at the time the
building burns is enough to create a defense. There is no need to de-
termine whether the prolonged vacancy was a "cause" of the loss.
There is no need to determine whether the prolonged vacancy en-
hanced the risk that a loss would occur or enhanced the risk that a loss
would be sizeable. There is no need to determine if the prolonged va-
cancy "prejudiced" the insurer. In such hypothetical fully bargained
contracts, even a "merely technical" failure of condition should be
enough to prevent the duty to pay from arising, for that is the alloca-
tion of risk to which the parties agreed.
B. Why Juridical Hazard Provisions Are Vulnerable
What seems appropriate for the hypothetical world of fully bar-
gained contracts may not seem so for standard forms in which provi-
sions purporting to allocate significant risks have been unilaterally
supplied by one party. Granted, the insurer's desire to economize on
the costs associated with juridical hazards is a legitimate one.
75. See generally Patterson, supra note 59; Vance, The History of the Development of
the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J. 523 (1911).
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Granted, too, the insurer need not invoke every defense available to
it;76 it could, for example, reserve defenses based on violations of a
"while vacant" provision for occasions where it believes that the un-
derlying facts suggest that the extended vacancy contributed to the
loss or increased the risk of loss to the insurer. But, by the terms of
the strict common law rule, the insurer need not do so, and in that
reserved discretion lies the vulnerability of juridical hazard provisions.
Lawyers and judges have been socialized by their training to regard
unbridled discretion with suspicion. "'he basic trouble with discre-
tion," one leading scholar has written, "is simply that it is lawless, in
the literal sense of that term."77 An insurer that chooses to invoke a
failure of condition defense in circumstances in which it appears that
the failure did not prejudice the insurer creates the impression that it
is employing a unilaterally supplied provision to create a "merely
technical" defense that needlessly works a "forfeiture" of the in-
sured's protection. And "forfeitures," not surprisingly, are a good bet
to attract judicial hostility.
C. A First Historical Example: Moral Hazard Warranties
Moral hazard warranties like the mortgage condition involved in
Fairbank provide an important historical example of this phenome-
non. For several decades in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, property insurance policies were laden with provisions
whose primary purpose was to protect insurers against moral
hazards.78 Of course, property insurers might have relied for protec-
76. Selmer, Gratuitous Deviation from the Terms of Form Contracts: Scandinavian
Insurance Companies' Administration of Deferred Acceptance-of-Risk Clauses,
33 U. Cm. L. REV. 502,503 (1966), provides a useful discussion of the Scandinavian
concept of "kulanse," the tendency to deviate from standard terms ex gratia.
American insurers regularly assure that they do the same. Of course, the obverse
of "kulanse" is "opportunism."
77. H. PACKER, THE Las OF THE CRnMINAL SANCTION 290 (1978). See also K. DA-
vIs, DISCRETIONARY JusncE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969)(opining that
'T here law ends, discretion begins").
78. The full text of the Fairban mortgage condition is revealing.
If there is or shall be other prior, concurrent, or subsequent insurance
(whether valid or not) on said property, or any part thereof, without the
company's consent hereon, or if said buildings or either of them is or
shall become vacant or unoccupied, or if the hazard shall be increased in
any way, or if the property or any part thereof shall be sold, conveyed,
incumbered by mortgage or otherwise, or any change takes place in the
title, use, occupation, or possession thereof whatever, or if any foreclo-
sure proceedings shall be commenced; or if the interest of the insured in
said property, or any part thereof, now is or shall become any other or
less than a perfect legal title and ownership, free from all liens
whatever, except as stated in writing hereon; or if the buildings or either
of them stand on leased ground or land, of which the assured [sic] has
not a perfect title; or if this policy shall be assigned without the written
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tion on the implied exception from coverage for losses caused by arson
or other intentional destruction of the insured property. They might
have provided explicitly in their policies that losses caused by arson or
by careless housekeeping induced by the presence of insurance or by
less-than-full interests in the property were excepted from coverage.
In fact, they did neither. Instead, property insurance policies of that
era were festooned with policy conditions declaring the policy void if
the named insured was not "the unconditional and sole owner" of the
insured property, if the property was covered by "other insurance," or
if there were encumbrances on the property. The courts, including
the Nebraska Supreme Court, responded with a barrage of decisions
effectively limiting such provisions. Divisibility analyses like that ap-
plied in Fairbank provided a tool, but so also did waiver and estoppel,
temporary breach, and other varieties of purposive interpretation. So
common was this judicial reaction that soon the insurance literature
was reporting that moral hazard warranties were especially likely to
attract judicial hostility.79
At first blush, that special vulnerability might seem to suggest judi-
cial hostility to the insurer's efforts to control the effects of moral haz-
ard on its treasury. Of course, such an antisocial attitude would be
difficult to defend. In fact, however, the judicial hostility toward
moral hazard warranties was hostility toward the insurer's method,
not hostility toward the ends it sought to achieve. Physical hazard
warranties could also sweep broadly-the standard fire policy provi-
sion declaring the policy void "if an illuminating gas or vapor be gener-
ated in the described building" by its terms permitted the insurer to
avoid liability whether or not the presence of the gas or vapor in fact
enhanced the risk of loss or contributed to a loss-but at least most
physical hazard warranties accorded more closely with lay perceptions
of circumstances likely to affect the risk. By contrast, a provision that
permitted the insurer to escape liability if the named insured's owner-
ship was less than full simply did not display that same obvious com-
mon sense connection between the failure of condition and enhanced
risk of loss, and thus was especially susceptible to judicial second-
guessing. But it was the method of the moral hazard conditions, not
their ends, that was responsible for their vulnerability.
consent hereon, then and in every such case this policy shall be abso-
lutely void.
German Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750, 752-53, 49 N.W. 711, 712 (1891)(quoting
the policy at issue).
79. See, e.g., Cohen, Encumbering Realty as Affecting the Moral Hazard in Fire In-
surance, 24 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1924); Goble, supra note 69; Patterson, supra
note 59, at 617-18, 620-31.
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D. The Legislative Response: Standard Forms and Warranty Statutes
Recognition of this pattern to what sometimes had been decried as
unprincipled and unpredictable judicial behavior eventually permitted
legislative remedial action to displace judicial activism as the primary
regulator of overly-broad warranty provisions. Sometimes the legisla-
tion involved direct and specific intervention. Life insurance policy
standardization statutes, for example, significantly curtailed the
number of warranties permitted, replacing many "while" conditions
with "caused by" provisions.80 The legislatively prescribed standard
fire policy went through similar changes.81 But the generalized em-
bodiment of concern with overly-broad warranties was felt in war-
ranty statutes that attempted to compromise the insurer's legitimate
interest in limiting its exposure to juridical hazard with the competing
concerns that the insurer not be left with unbridled discretion to as-
sert a failure of condition defense, whether or not the insurer had
been prejudiced by that failure. Warranty statutes came in two forms,
distinguished by the degree of prejudice they required the insurer to
demonstrate before it would be permitted to invoke a breach of war-
ranty defense. "Materiality" statutes permitted a defense if the in-
surer could show that the failure to satisfy a policy condition
"materially increased the risk of loss." The New York warranty stat-
ute was typical: "No breach of warranty shall avoid an insurance con-
tract or defeat recovery thereunder unless such breach materially
increased the risk of loss, damage or injury within the coverage of the
contract . . "82 In Nebraska, however, the "contribute to the loss"
statute forced even more of the costs of juridical hazard back on the
insurer:
The breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy of insurance
shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, unless such
breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the loss, anything in
the policy or contract of insurance to the contrary notwithstanding.
8 3
80. See generally W. MEYER, LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE LAW ch. 7 (1972). For a
discussion of the amalgam of motivations for these changes, see M. KELLER, THE
LIE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE 1885-1910 (1963); Keller, The Judicial System and
the Law of Life Insurance, 1888-1910, 35 Bus. HIST. REv. 317, 320-23 (1961);
Works, Coverage Clauses and Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of Post-
Claim Underwriting, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 809, 855-57.
81. See generally Wenck, The Historical Development of Standard Policies, 35 J.
RISK & INS. 537 (1968).
82. N.Y. INS. LAw § 150(2)(McKinney 1966).
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (Reissue 1988). The contribute to the loss statute was
first adopted in 1913 as part of a comprehensive revision of the insurance statutes.
1913 Neb. Laws 419 § 51. It has never been amended. See generally R. WORKS,
supra note 22, at ch. 3; Works, Insurance Policy Conditions and the Nebraska
Contribute to the Loss Statute: A Primer and a Partial Critique, 61 NEB. L. REV.
209 (1982). For a summary critique of the contribute to the loss standard, featur-




In effect, that statute made Fairbank's suggestion that insurance poli-
cies could be treated as divisible by cause of loss the legislatively man-
dated interpretation for all policy conditions within its ambit. The
statute did not try to constrain the insurer's discretion about which
moral and physical hazards to control through conditional policy lan-
guage, but it insisted that the insurer's legitimate desire to avoid the
costs associated with demonstrating causality could not justify throw-
ing the risk of forfeiture on the insured.
These developments effectively removed overly-broad warranties
from the judicial agenda in Nebraska. Thereafter, warranties ap-
peared much less frequently in the mainstream standard insurance
policy forms, and when they were encountered, the warranty statute
governed.
E. A Second Example: Postloss Conditions
The relevance of all this to understanding both old and new pock-
ets of judicial reluctance to enforce immaterial failures of postloss con-
ditions should be obvious. Warranties are not the only kinds of policy
provisions crafted to avoid or finesse causation questions, and causa-
tion questions are not the only source of juridical hazard. Postloss
conditions requiring timely notice to the insurer after an insured
event, cooperation by the insured in the liability insurer's efforts to
investigate a claim and mount a defense, and submission of proofs of
loss in prescribed form should all be understood as transparent dis-
plays of insurer concerns about juridical hazard. Yet postloss condi-
tions are not warranties; they do not try to protect the insurer against
potential causes of a loss. Instead, they try to protect the insurer
against potential complications in the insurer's efforts to adjust a loss
that has already occurred. As a result, neither "materiality" nor "con-
tribute to the loss" warranty statutes apply to such postloss conditions,
for it makes no sense to ask whether the insured's failure to give no-
tice within thirty days after a loss enhanced the risk that the loss
would occur or contributed to the loss.8 4
84. It has long been clear that postloss conditions are beyond the reach of the Ne-
braska contribute to the loss statute. George v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 121
Neb. 647, 238 N.W. 36 (1931), initially gave birth to the heresy that the statute
barred all defenses based on postloss conditions because a failure of a postloss
condition logically could never contribute to a loss. That literal reading of the
statute was shortlived. It was buried in Clark v. State Farmers Ins. Co., 142 Neb.
483, 7 N.W.2d 71 (1942). The coffin lid was nailed shut in Ach v. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 407, 215 N.W.2d 518 (1974). No doubt the court hopes that First
Sec. Bank & Trust v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d 188
(1989), and First Sec. Sav. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d
596 (1989), will be the stake through the heart.




However, the instinct expressed with such force in the early moral
hazard warranty cases and enshrined in the warranty statutes also ap-
plies to these postloss conditions. Like warranties, postloss conditions
purport to reserve to the insurer the discretion to invoke the failure of
condition even where it does not appear to have prejudiced the in-
surer. In the Fairbank era, the Nebraska Supreme Court's resistance
to technical failure of condition defenses-whether a failure to satisfy
a warranty or a failure to satisfy a postloss condition-was palpable.
The headnotes of the time announced that concern; purposive inter-
pretation, waiver, and estoppel vindicated it. Those decisions have
never been overruled. Those instincts have never been repudiated.
Instead, they have been allowed to atrophy.
Why? Because in most settings, other developments have taken
much of the sting out of the strict common law rule, and consequently
the tradition of aggressive judicial policing of failure of condition de-
fenses to avoid forfeitures has gone nearly dormant.8 The Willis-
tonian project of channelling the diverse tributaries of contracts into a
single mainstream 86 was, with most lawyers, a success: "As a general
rule," our modern insurance opinions tell us, "an insurance policy
should be considered as any other contract .... ,8 7 That may seem to
entail the conclusion that, absent statutory change, an express condi-
tion in an insurance policy should be treated like an express condition
in any other contract.8s But that isn't possible. The idea that express
conditions must be literally performed has survived as a doctrinal sta-
ple of mainstream contracts chiefly because its potential for creating
forfeitures has been ameliorated by the development of the doctrine
of substantial performance and by the growth of off-the-contract resti-
tutionary remedies.8 9 In insurance, however, neither escape hatch is
available. There is no room to characterize most insurance policy pro-
85. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981): "To the extent that the
non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court
may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a ma-
terial part of the agreed exchange."
86. See, e.g., I S. WILLISTON, WiLSTON ON CONTRACTS iii (1929)(emphasizing need to
rescue "[t]he law of contracts" from its tendency to "fall apart").
87. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Esterling, 205 Neb. 750, 752, 290 N.W.2d 209, 211 (1980).
88. Cf. Vold, Ex.press Conditionr in Contracts, 4 NEB. L. BULL. 215, 234 (1926)(early
local recognition that the putative generality of "the unflinching rule, enforcing
conditions of the contract according to their terms," papered over many modifica-
tions worked by statute, waiver and estoppel, and judicial construction for "ex-
ceptional cases," including especially insurance cases).
89. As one of the leading Contracts casebooks puts it:
In most respectable academic literature the idea that express conditions
[must be literally performed] is introduced only to be dismissed as false
or misleading. To many, if not most, practicing lawyers, however, the
idea seems to commend itself as an article of faith. Counsel for insur-
ance companies... have been particularly ardent believers in the sanc-
tity of express conditions.
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visions as promises rather than express conditions,90 so that substan-
tial performance arguments do not fit, and restitutionary theories
requiring the defendant to disgorge unjust enrichments have virtually
no application to an aleatory insurance contract in which the premium
is the only value moving from insured to insurer. Consequently, in
insurance the strict common law rule can operate with a strictness
unmatched in most other contractual settings. In the Fairbank era,
purposive interpretation routinely was employed to avoid the conse-
quences prescribed by the strict rule. But warranty statutes and
changes in standard policy forms have removed overly-broad warran-
ties from the judicial agenda, and simplifications in the way postloss
conditions are structured have greatly reduced the number of immate-
rial postloss failures of condition reaching the court. As a result, a
modern lawyer stumbling across nineteenth century headnotes railing
against forfeitures can be forgiven if she mistakenly assumes that in
their day these quaint-sounding canons of construction were as empty
and ceremonial as our own.
Certainly a lawyer reading Fairbank-era imprecations against for-
feitures after reading the court's 1958 decision in Farmers Mutual
Hail Insurance Co. v. Leonard 91 would be warranted in thinking that
the tradition of purposive interpretation to avoid a forfeiture was as
dead and forgotten as Fairbank's cow. In Leonard, the court enforced
a ten-day postloss notice provision in favor of an insurer with actual
notice of the loss and against an insured whose attempts to comply
were two days late because his son allowed the notice to ride around
on a car seat before mailing it. The contrast with Fairbank-era deci-
sions asking whether the defense was a "technical objection, not mate-
rially affecting the risk,"92 and whether "an honest effort was made to
comply with the policy,"9 3 could not have been more striking. In Leo-
F. KESSLER & G. GiLMoRE, supra note 23, at 846 (citation omitted). See also
Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. REV. 509, 515 (1981):
[C]ourts formerly made the mistake of assuming that all terms must be
conditions and that any breach, however trivial, justified the innocent
party in repudiating his own obligations. This error is now not generally
followed. The innocent party retains his claim to damages but is not jus-
tified in refusing performance of his own promise. Further, many of
these problem situations can be met by invoking restitutionary
principles.
See generally Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33
(1970)(arguing that the traditional rule has become "a myth").
90. Because in the usual insurance contract only the insurer undertakes duties, terms
requiring action by the insured are to be construed as conditions, not promises.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(2)(1981). See also General Credit
Corp. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemn. Co., 167 Neb. 833, 95 N.W.2d 145 (1959).
91. 167 Neb. 260, 92 N.W.2d 670 (1958).





nard it was clear the result matched the rule: the insurer had no lia-
bility if the insured did not strictly comply with postloss conditions,
even (it was better not to say) if the insurer was not prejudiced and
requiring strict compliance would work a forfeiture.
But in 1966, things changed once more. In MFA Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Sailors,94 an insured lied to the police after an accident and
failed to notify his automobile liability insurer when suit was brought
against him. Armed with a trial court determination that the in-
sured's conduct "had materially and substantially breached the terms
of the policy but that there was no showing of prejudice or detriment
to the [insurer," 95 and assured by the most standard of authorities
that there was "a substantial division of authority" on the question,
the court adopted the rule of "[t]he more recent cases" that "an in-
surer cannot assert a breach of the cooperation clause as a policy de-
fense in the absence of a showing of prejudice or detriment to the
insurer."96 Why? There were no citations to Fairbank-era purposive
interpretation decisions, but the echoes were there nonetheless:
The purpose of the cooperation clause is to prevent collusion between the in-
jured and the insured and to facilitate the handling of claims by the insurer.
Where there is no evidence of collusion between the injured and the insured
and it is not shown that the insurer has been prejudiced in its handling of the
claim, we think the better rule is that the breach of the policy is not a
defense.97
Only months later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meckna,98 the
court again applied a prejudice requirement to an insurer seeking to
invoke failure of a cooperation clause. And, the court held, the in-
surer's defense that the insured failed to satisfy a postloss notice con-
dition defense also must fail. This time the court did not treat the
prejudice requirement as an exception to the common law rule devel-
oped in other jurisdictions and ripe for adoption in Nebraska. Instead:
"What is the purpose of this provision? Patently, it is to alert the in-
surer to a possible claim and to afford it an opportunity to make such
investigation as it deems pertinent to enable it to process any future
claim." 99 Because the "[iusurer had all the information Meckna
could give it, and had ample notice to permit it to take any and all
necessary steps to protect its interest,"1 00 the insurer was not entitled
to a defense.
And so, it might appear, in Sailors and Meckna the Nebraska
Supreme Court revived long-dormant concerns about potential abuses
94. 180 Neb. 201, 141 N.W.2d 846 (1966).
95. Id. at 203, 141 N.W.2d at 848.
96. Id. at 204, 141 N.W.2d at 849.
97. Id.
98. 180 Neb. 516, 144 N.W.2d 73 (1966).
99. Id. at 525, 144 N.W.2d at 79.
100. Id. at 526, 144 N.W.2d at 80.
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of provisions that seek to control juridical hazard but that are immune
from the ameliorating influence of the warranty statute. In many
other jurisdictions, virtually identical expressions of concern have rip-
ened into a generalized requirement that prejudice be shown before
an insurer can successfully invoke a postloss failure of condition de-
fense.' 0 ' And, repeating the pattern first established by the moral
hazard condition decisions and the warranty statutes, recognition of
the common theme in judicial regulation of postloss conditions has led
a few jurisdictions to adopt legislation that requires a showing of prej-
udice before an insurer can invoke some postloss conditions as a
defense.102
But not in Nebraska. Twenty-five years later, the Sailors-Meckna
line of decisions numbers two-Sailors and Meckna.103 On at least
four occasions since 1966, the Nebraska Supreme Court has applied
101. See, e.g., 3 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 1414-15 (1969); 8 J. AP-
PLEMAN, supra, §§ 4741 & 4773 (1981); 13A C. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW §§ 49:50 & 49A:51 (Cum. Supp. 1989); 14 C. COUCH, supra § 51:107 (1982); 2 R.
LONG, THE LAW OF LIABIrrY INSURANCE §§ 13.05, 13.18, 14.04 (1985); Practising
Law Institute, Survey of the Law Relating to the Defense of Late Notice and
Whether the Insurer Must Show Prejudice, in INSURANCE, ExcEss & COVERAGE
DISPUTES 1987 (1987); Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability
Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Liability because of Insured's Failure or De-
lay in Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit Papers, 32
A.L.R.4th 141 (1984); 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance §§ 1333, 1371, 1431, 2045 (1982).
One of the most successful efforts to explain the prejudice rule is found in
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 75, 371 A.2d 193, 197 (1977):
[A] reasonable notice clause is designed to protect the insurance com-
pany from being placed in a substantially less favorable position than it
would have been in had timely notice been provided, e.g., being forced to
pay a claim against which it has not had an opportunity to defend effec-
tively. In short, the function of a notice requirement is to protect the
insurance company's interests from being prejudiced. Where the insur-
ance company's interests have not been harmed by a late notice, even in
the absence of extenuating circumstances to excuse the tardiness, the
reason behind the notice condition in the policy is lacking, and it follows
neither logic nor fairness to relieve the insurance company of its obliga-
tions under the policy in such a situation.
102. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.81(1)(West 1980):
Provided notice or proof of loss is furnished as soon as reasonably possi-
ble and within one year after the time it was required by the policy, fail-
ure to furnish such notice or proof within the time required by the policy
does not invalidate or reduce a claim unless the insurer is prejudiced
thereby and it was reasonably possible to meet the time limit.
103. In Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 298 F. Supp. 898 (D. Neb. 1969), the
federal district court concluded that no defense should be available for breach of
a proofs of loss requirement when the insurer had received actual notice within a
few days of the loss, but the court did not squarely address the prejudice issue. In
Trausch v. Knecht, 184 Neb. 134, 165 N.W.2d 738 (1969), the court followed Sailors
in holding that the failure to notify a liability insurer of commencement of a suit
against the insured would not give the insurer a defense in the absence of preju-
dice, but that opinion was later withdrawn. Trausch v. Knecht, 184 Neb. 511, 169
N.W.2d 269 (1969).
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the strict common law rule to a postloss failure of condition.104 In
these opinions there is no hint of the existence of Sailors or Meckna,
not to mention the Fairbank-era decisions. And without a sense of
how Sailors and Meckna fit into the history of judicial control of jurid-
ical hazard provisions, those involved in the debate over whether the
Nebraska Supreme Court should extend a prejudice requirement to
other postloss insurance conditions have been left without an argu-
ment. If the prevailing orthodoxy regards a policy provision as an ex-
press condition and declares that, absent statutory change, express
conditions must be fully satisfied, how does one go about contending
that an immaterial, technical failure of a postloss condition should not
be fatal to the insured's claim? Could the proof of loss requirement be
characterized as a promise, rather than a condition? 05 Of course not,
said the court.106 Could the court be convinced to change its long-
standing position that the "contribute to the loss" statute does not ap-
ply to postloss conditions? 0 7 Not a chance, said the court.1 08 Should
the strict common law rule be abandoned for postloss conditions be-
cause that is the emerging trend in other jurisdictions?' 0 9 Since
Sailors, the court has not even acknowledged the existence of that
trend.
And so, once again, how one understands the story depends on the
perspective one brings to the effort. Seen as part of a half-century's
judicial treatment of postloss conditions in Nebraska, Sailors and
Meckna are aberrational departures from the otherwise consistent ap-
104. First Sec. Sav. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d 596 (1989);
First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d
188 (1989); Dockendorf v. Orner, 206 Neb. 456, 293 N.W.2d 395 (1980); Ach v.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 407, 215 N.W.2d 518 (1974).
105. Brief of Appellant at 34-35, First See. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 232 Neb. 493,441 N.W.2d 188 (1989)(No. 87-897). There was some faint reason
to hope; in Northern Assurance Co. v. Hanna, 60 Neb. 29, 82 N.W. 97 (1900), the
court seized on the absence of specific language of forfeiture in a proof of loss
provision as support for characterizing it as something other than a strict condi-
tion, and the heresy was repeated in Keene Coop. Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmers
Union Indus. Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Neb. 287, 128 N.W.2d 773 (1964). Of course, both
Hanna and Keene are inconsistent with the rest of the Nebraska law of insurance,
which routinely characterizes such provisions as express conditions.
106. First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 505, 441
N.W.2d 188, 196 (1989).
107. Brief of Appellant at 26-34, First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d 188 (1989)(No. 89-176); Brief of Appellant 27-36,
First Sec. Say. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d 596
(1989)(No. 87-897).
108. First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 505-06, 441
N.W.2d 188, 196 (1989).
109. Brief of Appellant at 16-26, 37-48, First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W.2d 188 (1989)(No. 89-176); Brief of Appellant 18-27,
39-50, First See. Sav. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 233 Neb. 335, 445 N.W.2d 596
(1989)(No. 87-897).
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plication of the strict common law rule. But viewed in the full sweep
of a history extending over more than a century, it is the current Ne-
braska law of postloss conditions, not Sailors or Meckna or the Fair-
bank-era decisions, that needs explaining.
IV. CONCLUSION
The primary lesson to be drawn from this brief retrospective is the
obvious one: an appreciation of the role and dangers of juridical haz-
ard provisions in standard insurance policy forms can be a powerful
tool for explaining insurance law decisions-both old and new-that
apply a prejudice rule to some postloss conditions, and for guiding ap-
plication of that rule. In Nebraska, recognition of that lesson should
be an important first step toward correcting the anomalies in the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's current treatment of postloss conditions.
Elsewhere, it should provide guidance for the resolution of continuing
uncertainties about which postloss conditions should be subjected to a
prejudice standard,110 and should stimulate thought about how to con-
110. Simply put, a prejudice requirement for postloss conditions makes sense only for
those provisions that are there to protect the insurer against juridical hazards in
the claims adjustment process; to the extent that a postloss condition plays a dif-
ferent role, it should be immune from a prejudice requirement.
Should the prejudice rule apply to suit conditions, like that encountered in
Fairbank? Most jurisdictions that have adopted a prejudice requirement for
postloss loss adjustment conditions do not apply it to suit conditions. Why not?
Because, like the Fairbank court, they ascribe to the suit provision functions that
go beyond simply protecting the insurer from juridical hazard. As one court put
the distinction:
A failure to abide by the limitation of action condition in a policy stands
on a much different footing than a non-compliance with the notice provi-
sions .... [T]he main purpose underlying the notice stipulations is to
safeguard the insurer from prejudice in processing a claim. Therefore,
where an insurer's interests have not been harmed by a late notice, the
reason for the notice condition is lacking. By contrast, limitation periods
on suits are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through
revival of stale claims, to protect defendants and courts from handling
matters in which the search for truth may be impaired by loss of evi-
dence, to encourage plaintiffs to use reasonable and proper diligence in
enforcing their rights, and to prevent fraud. The presence or absence of
prejudice is not, nor should it be, a factor in deciding whether an insurer
may effectively assert this defense under the policy.
Zieba v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 549 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (D. Conn.
1982)(citations omitted). See also Brandywine One Hundred Corp. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 405 F. Supp. 147, 151 (D. Del. 1975)(stating "[Tihe purpose of the
[notice provision] is to avoid prejudice; the [suit limitation provision] is simply a
contractual modification of the statute of limitations.").
Should the prejudice rule be applicable to notice provisions in claims made
liability insurance policies? The question is not yet settled, in large part because
the legitimacy of the fundamental shift of risk from insurer to insured worked by
the change from occurrence to claims made formats is still being contested. In
that setting, reaching agreement on how to ascribe a purpose to the notice re-
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struct a prejudice standard with a more nuanced allocation of the costs
of juridical hazard.111 And everywhere recognition that the prejudice
rule is grounded in an instinct to regulate the discretion juridical haz-
ard provisions confer may prove useful for explaining other insurance
policy provisions that historically have seemed likely to attract judicial
lightning.112
But there is a broader lesson to be learned as well. The effort to
locate Fairbank within a history that ranges from Lippold through
Leonard and Sailors and Meckna to the First Security decisions
should remind us that one need not be in the front ranks of intellec-
tual jousting over the possibilities of determinacy in the reading of
legal texts to be engaged in work that can be enriched by a little self-
quirement has been impossible. See generally Business Insurance, July 30, 1990,
at 1, col. 1; Business Insurance, Aug. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 1. For a collection of au-
thorities, and views from both sides, compare Anderson, Current Issues in
Claims-Made Insurance Policies, 14 ALI-ABA COURSE MArERLs J. 57 (1989)
with Kaiman & Nachison, Courts in the Business of Insurance: Claims Made and
Reported Policies, 57 DEF. CouNs. J. 43 (1990).
111. Recognizing that some broadly drafted policy conditions are efforts to economize
on the costs associated with juridical hazards does not mean that they should be
blindly enforced, but neither does it mean that the insurer necessarily should
bear all the burdens of that juridical hazard. A creative allocation of the burdens
of proof and the use of presumptions might well curtail unacceptable opportu-
nism without forcing the insurer to bear all of the costs of juridical uncertainties.
See, e.g., Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 222 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1969)(insurer
denied failure of notice condition defense if insured can demonstrate insurer not
prejudiced); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Valley Steel Erectors, Inc., 13 Ohio App. 2d 41, 233
N.E.2d 597 (1968)(insurer enjoys rebuttable presumption that it was prejudiced
by delay). See also Goetz, Contractual Remedies and the Normative Acceptability
of State-Imposed Coercion, 4 CATO J. 975 (1985)(emphasizing need for tradeoffs
between process values and substantive results); Note, Common-Law Due Process
Rights in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1021 (1988)(urging public-law
analysis of problems of discretion in performance of contracts).
112. "Evidentiary conditions"--provisions that require that there be some specified
evidence concerning the cause of loss-are prime candidates for this treatment.
For example, accidental dismemberment policies conditioning liability on proof
that the loss of limb occurred within ninety days after the injury accident respond
to legitimate insurer concerns about the difficulties of establishing causal respon-
sibility for a loss, but can operate in a way that triggers the same disquiet that
prompted enactment of the warranty statutes. A leg injured in an accident may
not be amputated until more than ninety days have elapsed because doctors used
heroic but ultimately unsuccessful measures to save the leg, there has been a
failure of condition, but there is no doubt that the accident caused the loss of the
leg. But, of course, warranty statutes do not apply to evidentiary conditions. See
generally R. WORKS, supra note 22, at 129-132; Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance
Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the Evidentiary Condition, 12 GA. L. REV. 783
(1978).
Doubtless, too, the harsh treatment accorded approval style binding receipts
through the years might be usefully viewed through this lens. See generally
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947); R. KEEroN,
supra note 64, § 2.3, at 36; E. PATrERSON, supra note 70, § 20, at 100-01.
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consciousness about interpretive strategies. The strict common law
rule is strict, it turns out, only if we indulge the positivist conceit that
determination of a policy provision's meaning must be kept divorced
from a determination of its legal effect. And the "prejudice rule," it
turns out, is less a rule than an interpretive technique, a way of trying
to make a policy provision's message no more than is necessary to re-
flect the insurer's reasons for putting it there. In the Fairbank era the
selfconscious search for a functional interpretation of policy language
that would accomplish the insurer's purpose but deny the insurer a
defense where the failure of condition did not prejudice the insurer
was a. fact of insurance life, reflected not only in the substantive re-
sults being reached but also in the generalized warnings against for-
feitures enshrined in the court's syllabi, in the insurance treatises, and
eventually in the warranty statutes. Today things are much different.
Today's headnotes counsel that policy language be understood as a hy-
pothetical policyholder would understand it, and that any ambiguities
be construed against the insurer, thus shifting the focus away from an
effort to determine the real reasons the provision is in the policy to an
effort to imagine what the provision might be made to mean to an
imaginary policyholder should he chance to read it. In such a setting,
the strict common law rule can flourish. And that's a shame. We used
to do much better.
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